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Is Natural Slavery Beneficial?
T h o r N T o N  C .  L o C k w o o d ,  J r . *
slavery is the dark shadow cast upon Aristotle’s Politics.1 No doubt, Aristotle’s 
qualified defense of slavery seems indefensible to modern readers insofar as it 
denies the infinite intrinsic worth which today we ascribe to each and every au-
tonomous human being. But, to add insult to injury, commentators have located 
problems within Aristotle’s treatment of slavery which make his defense, in the 
late Bernard williams’ words, “a disaster” and proof that, “if there is something 
worse than accepting slavery, it consists in defending it.”2 To seize upon one major 
inconsistency: according to the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics, master and slave 
share neither a common benefit (to; koinh̀/ sumfevron), nor an association (koinwniva), 
and their relationship manifests neither friendship nor justice.3 Indeed, the Ethics 
depicts the relationship between master and slave as an illustration of the extent 
to which friendship and justice are absent in a tyranny.4 Such remarks seem to 
conflict with the account of slavery in Politics I, where Aristotle distinguishes and 
juxtaposes masterly and political rule in order to disprove the claim that “the 
same person has expertise in political rule, kingly rule, household rule, and the 
* Thornton C. Lockwood, Jr. is a Post doctoral Fellow in the Philosophy department at 
Fordham University.
1 Aristotle cites a line apparently adapted from hesiod—“‘first a house [oijko~], a wife, and an ox 
for ploughing’ (and the ox served as the household slave [oijkevth~] for the poor)”—as proof for the 
necessity of servants within the household (oijkiva). See hesiod, Works and Days (oxford: Clarendon, 
1978), 405; Pol. I.2: 1252b11–12; Oec. I.2: 1343a22. Cf. Pol. VI.8: 1323a5–6. (Throughout this paper, 
unless otherwise indicated, translations of the Ethics and Politics are my own, based on the Greek texts of 
Bywater, Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea [oxford: Clarendon, 1894], ross, Aristotelis Politica [oxford: Clar-
endon, 1957], and walzer and Mingay, Aristotelis Ethica Eudemia [oxford: Clarendon, 1991]. I am much 
indebted to the translations of Irwin, rackham, and Simpson. Unless indicated otherwise, all references 
inserted within the text are to the Bekker page numbers of Aristotle’s texts.) Although Aristotle’s ideal 
city ultimately includes non-hellenic slaves, in general, Aristotle prefers private as opposed to public 
slaves, and most likely far fewer in number than existed in Athens in his time. See w. L. Newman, The 
Politics of Aristotle [Politics] (oxford: oxford University Press, 1887), vol. 1, 138–58; d. B. Nagle, The 
Household as the Foundation of Aristotle’s Politics [Household] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 102–17; and J. ober, Political Dissent in Democratic Athens [Political Dissent] (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), 304–08, 344–47. For a review of some of the philosophical literature, see A. 
Preus, “Aristotle on Slavery: recent reactions,” Philosophical Inquiry 15 (1993): 33–47.
2 B. williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 115, 111. 
3 EN VIII.11: 1161a32–b10; cf. EE VII.9: 1241b13–24, VII.10: 1242a28–31.
4 EN VIII.10: 1160b27–32, VIII.11: 1161a32–35.
208 journal  of  the  h istory  of  philosophy  45 :2  apr il  2007
rule of a master” (Pol. I.1: 1252a7–9). Aristotle rejects the Socratic notion of a 
unitary science of ruling in Politics I, on the basis of the difference in kind between 
ruling a free man and ruling a slave,5 but in the process of making his argument, 
he asserts not only that the relationship of master and slave is just, but also that 
it is beneficial to each.6 whereas the ethical treatises deny any common benefit 
between a master and slave, the Politics unambiguously asserts that master and 
slave have the same benefit.7 
A careful examination of Aristotle’s arguments in the Ethics and Politics turns 
up a surprising distinction which, I will argue, allows him to evade the charge of 
internal inconsistency on the question of whether slavery is beneficial to a natural 
slave. Aristotle distinguishes, on the one hand, between a “common” benefit that 
can belong to two separate persons, and, on the other hand, the “same” benefit 
which exists between master and slave since they are, strictly speaking, one person 
in two bodies. once one understands Aristotle’s distinction, arguably, there is no 
explicit contradiction between the accounts in the Ethics and Politics. Nonethe-
less, when one steps away form the text and ponders the viability of distinguish-
ing between a “common” and “same” benefit between two humans, problems 
remain. In the first section of this paper, I examine the passages which have led 
commentators to believe that Aristotle contradicts himself on the question of the 
benefit which exists between master and slave. In the second section, I show how 
Aristotle’s distinction between two different kinds of benefit is a potential solution 
to the claim that the Politics and the Ethics contradict one another on this issue. 
Finally, in the third section, I conclude by considering why Aristotle endorsed 
slavery rather than hired labor.
1 .  t h e  a p p a r e n t  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  o f  e n  v i i i . 9 – 1 2 / e e 
v i i . 9 – 1 0  a n d  P o l i t i c s  I . 4 – 6
Let me begin by examining Aristotle’s remarks about the sumfevron, or “benefit,”8 
which exists between a master and slave in the ethical treatises. The Nicomachean 
and Eudemian Ethics provide parallel texts which, although different and compli-
5 Pol. I.7: 1255b16–20; cf. I.1: 1252a7–16, I.3: 1253b18–23, and I.5: 1254b2–6. See M. Schofield, 
“Ideology and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Theory of Slavery” [“Ideology and Philosophy”], in his Saving 
the City (New York: routledge, 1999), 128–32; and M. deslauriers, “The Argument of Aristotle’s Politics 
I” [“Argument”], Phoenix 60 (2006): 48–69. For the Socratic “science of ruling” being criticized, see 
Plato, Statesman, 258e–59d; Xenophon, Memorabilia, III.4, 12; III.6, 12; Oikonomikos, XIII.5, XXI.10; 
and deslauriers, “Argument,” 55–59. For the significance of Aristotle’s argument against the Socratic 
position, see E. Garver, “Aristotle and the will to Power: Character and reason in Slavery and Free-
dom,” Philosophy and the Contemporary World 13 (2006): 74–83. 
6 Pol. I.5.1255a1–3; cf. I.5: 1254a16–20, 24, 1254b10–13, b16–20, I.6: 1255b6–9.
7 Pol. I.6: 1255b12–15. For a detailed list of the internal inconsistencies which commentators 
have found in Aristotle’s treatment of slavery, see N. Smith, “Aristotle’s Theory of Natural Slavery” 
[“Aristotle’s Theory”] in A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics, ed. d. keyt and F. d. Miller (oxford and 
Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 143–46. 
8 The term ‘sumfevron’ has a broad range of meanings, but all of them are ultimately related to 
what is good or beneficial. The term’s meaning can range from “the expedient” (e.g., the military or 
trade policies of a polis [EN VIII.4:1157a27–28, Rh. I.3:1358b21–25]) to the notion of “the common 
good” (to; koinh`/ sumfevron), which is the foundation of justice in the Politics (Pol. III.6:1279a17–21; cf. 
EN VIII.9:1160a11–14). Etymologically, the word derives from the verb ‘sumfevrw’, which means “to 
bring together,” “to contribute,” “to bear jointly.”
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mentary, nonetheless both unequivocally deny that master and slave have some-
thing in common, and thus justice and friendship in their relations. The passages 
occur in EN VIII.9–12 (and the briefer, parallel discussion in EE VII.9–10), and 
the immediate context is Aristotle’s inquiry into the relationship between justice 
and friendship in relationships within the household (oijkiva), and their likenesses 
in the different kinds of regime-types (politei`ai).9 The basis of the discussion is 
Aristotle’s claim that 
It seems likely, just as was said at the outset, that friendship and justice would seem to 
be about the same things and to be found in the same people. For in every associa-
tion [koinwniva] there seems to be some sort of justice [ti divkaion] and some type of 
friendship also. (EN VIII.9:1159b25–27)
As Michael Pakaluk glosses the passage, Aristotle seems to be asserting that “friend-
ship, justice, and association [koinwniva] are coextensive,” and further, that these 
three things “vary together in degree” and “vary together in form.”10 For example, 
Aristotle will say that justice and friendship in the relationship between a father and 
a son is analogous in form and degree to that which exists between a royal ruler 
and a subject. Similarly, in other “right relations,” justice and friendship between 
a husband and a wife are analogous to those between aristocrats, and justice and 
friendship between brothers are analogous to those between fellow citizens in a 
timocracy or a republic. But the analysis also holds in “deviant” or unjust relation-
ships: since tyranny is the deviation from royal rule, then the form and degree of 
justice and friendship in a tyranny are similar or analogous to those which exist 
between a master and a slave. The husband/wife relationship which deviates from 
the aristocratic model is oligarchic, and the sibling relationship which deviates 
from the timocratic model is democratic.11 
It is here that we find Aristotle’s only extended discussion of slavery in the ethical 
treatises: since relationships within the household provide a “model” (paravdeigma) 
for relationships in the city, Aristotle explains the “deviant” relationship between 
father and son on the basis of despotic or tyrannical rule in a regime. he writes:
The association [koinwniva] of a father and his sons has the form of royal-rule, since the 
father is concerned for his children. . . . Among the Persians, however, the father’s 
rule is tyrannical, since he treats his sons as slaves. The rule of a master over his slaves 
is also tyrannical, since it is the master’s benefit [to; ga;r tou` despovtou sumfevron] that 
is achieved in it. (EN VIII.10:1160b24–25, 27–30)
In the sequel of VIII.11, Aristotle takes as his task to prove that, in fact, koinwniva, 
justice, and friendship vary as he had set out in EN VIII.9; and he does so in part 
by articulating the precise nature of friendship in each relationship. After having 
specified how friendship exists between father and son, between husband and wife, 
and between brothers, he turns to the “deviant” relationships and says:
9 See my article, “Justice in Aristotle’s household and City,” Polis 20 (2003): 1–21; and Nagle, 
Household, 177–202.
10 M. Pakaluk, Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics Books VIII and IX (oxford: oxford University Press, 
1998), 111–12. 
11 EN VIII.10:1160b23–61a9; cf. EE VII.9:1241b24–32.
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In the deviations, however, justice is found only to a slight degree; and hence the same 
is true of friendship. There is least of it in the worst deviation; for in a tyranny there 
is little or no friendship. For where ruler and ruled have nothing in common, they 
have no friendship, since they have no justice either, as, for example, in the case of 
a craftsman in relationship to a tool, a soul in relationship to a body, and a master in 
relationship to a slave. For in all these cases it is the user who is benefited [wjfeleìtai], 
but there is neither justice nor friendship toward inanimate things. Nor is there any 
toward a horse or cow, or toward a slave, insofar as he is a slave. For master and slave 
have nothing in common [oujde;n ga;r koinovn], since a slave is a tool with a soul, while 
a tool is a slave without a soul. (EN VIII.11:1161a30–b5)
Aristotle has more to say, but let me pause for the moment, in order to underscore 
the main thrust of this passage. 
In his analysis of relations in the household and the city, Aristotle had established 
that associations are relationships in which two or more people have something 
in common, and that all such relationships exhibit patterns of justice and friend-
ship. But since association, justice, and friendship vary together in degree and 
form, in a relationship between two people in which nothing is in common, there 
is no “association,” nor is there justice or friendship (or, at least, none which is 
significant—a point to which I will turn at the end of section 2 below). Thus, since 
the master and slave have nothing in common, it follows that their relationship 
is not an association, and as such, it lacks both friendship and justice. It appears 
that slavery in the household is nothing more than a sort of Persian despotism in 
which the ruler exploits the ruled for the sake of the ruler’s benefit. Therefore, it 
would appear that, according to the Nicomachean Ethics, the relationship between 
a master and a slave is an exploitative one which benefits only the master. 
As numerous commentators have pointed out, such a characterization of the 
relationship between master and slave seems irreconcilable with the account of 
slavery in the first book of the Politics, which explicitly argues that slavery is ben-
eficial for both master and slave.12 Although the extended argument of Politics 
I—which concerns not just slavery, but also the refutation of a Socratic unitary 
science of rule, and the basis for the accumulation of property within the house-
hold—is too complicated to contextualize briefly,13 the conclusion which contra-
dicts the claim of the Ethics can be excised without too much distortion. Briefly, 
Aristotle examines the question of what sorts of property and tools are necessary 
for the household, and concludes that a slave is a living piece of property (kth`mav 
ti e[myucon) (Pol. I.4:1253b32). Specifically, the natural slave is defined as “anyone 
who, while a human being, does not by his nature belong to himself [mh; auJtou` 
12 See Price, Love and Friendship in Aristotle and Plato [Love and Friendship] (oxford: Clarendon, 
1989), 176–78; C. C. w. Taylor, “Politics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 254–57; P. Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine 
[Ideas of Slavery] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 124–26; P. A. Brunt, “Aristotle and 
Slavery,” in his Studies in Greek History and Thought (oxford: oxford University Press, 1999), 366–71; M. 
Schofield, “Appendix 2: Slaves and Friendship,” in his Saving the City, 137–40; M. harvey, “deliberation 
and Natural Slavery” [“deliberation”], Social Theory and Practice 27 (2001): 54–57; r. kraut, Aristotle 
Political Philosophy [Aristotle] (New York: oxford University Press, 2002), 295–301.
13 For the argumentative structure of Politics I, see Schofield, “Ideology and Philosophy,” 128–31; 
C. Natali, “La struttura unitaria del libro I della ‘Politica’ di Aristotele,” Polis 3 (1979/80): 2–18; and 
deslauriers, “Argument,” 48–52.
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fuvsei] but to another is by nature a slave” (Pol. I.4:1254a14–15). Infamously, 
Aristotle continues in the subsequent chapter to decide whether or not such a 
natural slave exists, and if he does, whether such slavery is better and just for him 
(1254a17–19).14 To cut to the chase, let me quote Aristotle’s conclusion, which 
comes at the end of Politics I.6:
So it clear that the dispute about slavery has some reason behind it and that some slaves 
are both by nature slaves and some free are not by nature free. It is also clear that in 
other cases a natural distinction does obtain, where it is beneficial [sumfevrei] and just 
for the one to be a slave and the other a master. here the first should be ruled by the 
second with the rule for which the second is naturally fitted, namely mastery. But if 
mastery is exercised badly, it is not beneficial to either of them, for part and whole, 
body and soul, are benefited by the same thing [to; ga;r aujto; sumfevrei] and the slave 
is a part of his master as a sort of living but separate part of his body. Consequently, 
a certain benefit [sumfevron ejstiv ti] and friendship exist between master and slave 
when they deserve by nature to be master and slave. (Pol I.6: 1255b4–14)
As a part of the master, the slave shares in the same benefit (taujto; sumfevrei) 
which the master receives (1255b9–10, 1252a35); but further, such a benefit is 
even the grounds for a kind of friendship between master and slave. Although 
the Politics never contradicts the Ethics concerning whether or not the master and 
slave exist together in a koinwniva, the claims that slavery is beneficial and just for a 
natural slave, and that there exists a kind of friendship between master and slave 
based on such an identical benefit, are in direct opposition to the discussion in 
the ethical treatises. 
As noted above, commentators have often taken Aristotle to task for this major 
inconsistency in his account of slavery. Some, such as williams and Brunt, think 
that Aristotle was simply in the grip of an ideologically or historically inescapable 
worldview which forced him to make contradictory assertions.15 others, such as 
Garnsey and Schofield, have taken a developmental approach to the problem, 
and suggested that Aristotle’s inconsistency on the question can be resolved by 
attributing the different texts to different times of composition.16 Somewhat 
more ambitiously, others, such as Ambler and Nichols, have suggested that the 
contradictions in Aristotle account of slavery are intended, and that they indicate 
an esoteric critique of slavery as it was practiced in Aristotle’s time.17 Although 
different commentators have arrived at different solutions to the contradiction, 
so far as I can tell, all are agreed that Aristotle’s texts are irreconcilable, insofar 
as they, at one and the same time, assert that slavery is and is not beneficial to the 
14 For a recent summary of the debate concerning natural slavery in the Politics, see Tony Burns, 
“The Tragedy of Slavery: Aristotle’s Rhetoric and the history of the Concept of Natural Law,” History of 
Political Thought 24 (2003): 16–36, at 18–28. 
15 See williams, Shame and Necessity, 115–16; Brunt, “Aristotle and Slavery,” 344–45, 367–68. Cf. 
E. wood and N. wood, Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory [Class Ideology] (New York: oxford 
University Press, 1978), 230–33. 
16 See Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 125–27; Schofield, “Slavery and Friendship,” 137–40. Cf. J. rist, 
The Mind of Aristotle (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 154–57. 
17 See w. Ambler, “Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery,” Political Theory 15 (1987), 
405–07; M. Nichols, “The Good Life, Slavery, and Acquisition: Aristotle’s Introduction to Politics,” 
Interpretation 11 (1983), 173–76. Cf. M. davis, The Politics of Philosophy (Lanham, Md: rowman and 
Littlefield, 1996), 15–32.
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slave.18 I propose that, in fact, Aristotle’s claims about whether slavery is beneficial 
are consistent, if one understands the distinction between the “common benefit” 
shared by two people and the “same benefit” shared by a whole and its parts.
2 .  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t o;  k o i n h/  
s u m f e v r o n  a n d  t a uj t o;  s u m f ev r o n
I contend that Aristotle distinguishes between a “common benefit,” which presup-
poses at least two separate persons who share some goal in common, and “the 
same benefit,” which exists between a part and the whole of which it is a part. In 
this section, I simply want to present evidence to prove that Aristotle makes use of 
this distinction and to look at some passages which might seem to undercut the 
distinction. The question of whether or not the distinction which Aristotle makes 
is a viable one is something I leave for section 3 below. Let me begin by noting 
that I can find no instance in the Aristotelian corpus (notwithstanding the appar-
ent exceptions I examine below) in which Aristotle asserts that a master and slave 
share something in common or that their relationship is a koinwniva, or association. 
rather, Aristotle consistently maintains that the slave is a part of the master. Thus, 
there is no injustice towards a slave, because one cannot wrong oneself, and a slave 
is w{sper mevro~ auJtoù (EN V.6:1134b11); the slave is likened to being a tool (o[rganon) 
or member (movrion) of the master (EN VIII:11.1161a34, EE VII.9:1241b23, Pol. 
I.4:1254a9–11, a17); the slave is related to the master as body is related to soul, 
namely, as that which rules is related to that which is ruled (EN VIII.11:1161a35, 
EE VII.9:1241b17–18, Pol. I.5:1254a34–b2); 19 and that there is nothing common 
(mhde;n koinovn) between the ruler and the ruled (EN VIII.11:1161a33).20 
There are two interesting passages which appear to undermine my claim that Ar-
istotle unequivocally denies that there is anything in common between master and 
slave. In Politics I.13, Aristotle’s claim that a slave must possess a minimum of virtue in 
order to fulfill his or her tasks sparks a new question: must not also artisans (tecnivtai) 
possess virtue, since they too can do their work poorly? Aristotle claims: 
18 Price (Love and Friendship, 177–78) resolves the inconsistency by suggesting that Aristotle 
ultimately has two aspects of the natural slave in mind—using Aristotle’s terminology, slave qua slave, 
and slave qua human (1161b5–6)—and so resolves the inconsistency through the distinction within 
the same person. Barker long ago pointed out that such a “distinction is impossible,” and thus, that 
Aristotle’s theory is “refuted by its own author in the course of its statement” (E. Barker, The Political 
Thought of Plato and Aristotle [New York: dover, 1959], 366, 367). when the present article was accepted 
for publication in June, 2004, I was unaware of any authors who thought these texts reconcilable. Nagle, 
Household, and P. Simpson, “Aristotle’s defensible defense of Slavery” [“defense”], Polis 23 (2006): 
95–115, subsequently drew upon my unpublished manuscript and endorsed its thesis.
19 Some authors, such as w. w. Fortenbaugh, have argued that the relationship between master 
and slave is modeled better by the relationship between the rational and the desiring parts of the soul 
(see Pol. I.5.1254b5–6, and w. w. Fortenbaugh, “Aristotle on Slaves and woman,” in Articles on Aristotle 
2: Ethics and Politics, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield, and r. Sorabji [London: duckworth, 1977], 135–9). 
But as Smith points out, Aristotle seems to think that the reason/desire model is more appropriate for 
the male/female relationship (see Pol. I.5.1254b13–16, I.12.1259b1–4, I.13.1260a7–14, and Smith, 
“Aristotle’s Theory,” 146; see also M. deslauriers, “Aristotle on the Virtues of Slaves and women” 
[“Virtues”], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 25 [2003]: 213–31, at 221–29). 
20 deslauriers (“Virtues,” 216) suggests that “natural subjects . . . acquire virtue by borrowing 
the phronesis of a natural ruler.” Such a position reinforces my claim that the slave and master are two 
parts of one whole.
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The case is very different, surely? For the slave shares his master’s life [oJ doùlo~ koinwno;~ 
zwh`~], but the artisan is more remote and has as much of virtue as he has of slavery 
(for the artisan mechanic [bavnouso~ tecnivth~] has a separated slavery [ajfwrismevnhn 
tina; e[cei douleivan]). (Pol I.13: 1260a39–b1)21 
Banausic artisans, in other words, are only “temporary slaves” when they are actu-
ally employed, and thus, as Peter Simpson points out, they “are worse and lower 
than slaves, and only rise to the level of slavery, and of slavish virtue, when actually 
employed by someone.”22 In this instance, when Aristotle asserts that the slave has 
in common (koinwnov~) the master’s biological life (zw/`on), his juxtaposition of the 
natural slave with such “temporary slaves,” or day-laborers, suggests that the master 
and slave exist in a symbiotic unity unlike any sort of modern employee/employer 
relationship. Indeed, Aristotle’s assertion that the slave shares in a master’s life 
or zw/`on (as opposed to bivo~, or “way of life”) suggests an even stronger unity: 
whereas, say, an itinerant worker, employed only during harvest time, shares in 
and contributes to a farmer’s bottom line, the natural slave is not someone hired 
or fired, as suits the employer, but almost an extension of the master, much like 
a wet nurse is the extension of a mother.23 In any case, although Aristotle in this 
passage does suggest that master and slave “have something in common,” that 
thing in common is not just some good or goal internal to their relationship; 
rather, it is their symbiotic unity. 
The second passage which appears to contradict my claim that master and slave 
have nothing in common is located in Pol. I.5. Aristotle claims that:
For in everything that is fashioned into a common unity [e{n ti koinovn], whether the 
parts be continuous and discrete, a ruling and a ruled part are apparent, and this 
inheres in living things from the whole of nature. (1254a28–32)
In the examples that follow, body and soul, or intellect and desire, are “continuous” 
(sunecovn) common unities, whereas man and woman, or human and domesticated 
animal, are “discrete” (dih/rhmevnon) common unities. Aristotle’s text does not ex-
plicitly specify whether master and slave form a continuous or discrete unity, but 
the evidence I have furnished above suggests that master and slave are a “continu-
ous unity,” rather than a discrete one. But in either case, the point is the same: 
although Aristotle does claim that a master and slave have something in common 
(ti koinovn), that commonality is an organic unity, not a koinwniva or association.
I have emphasized that master and slave have nothing in common because Ar-
istotle seems to be suggesting that difference is a necessary condition of koinwniva. 
Aristotle denies that there exists a koinwniva between master and slave because they 
are inseparable as persons or selves. Let me cite an extended passage from the 
Eudemian Ethics which most clearly articulates the point:
All constitutions [politei`ai] are some form of what is just, for they are associations 
[koinwnivai], and every thing which is common [to; koino;n pa`n] is established on the 
21 1260a39–60b1, P. Simpson, trans., The Politics of Aristotle (Chapel hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1997). 
22 P. Simpson, A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle (Chapel hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1998), 69. 
23 For the distinction between bivo~ and zw/`on, see d. keyt, “The Meaning of BIOS in Aristotle’s 
Ethics and Politics,” Ancient Philosophy 9 (1989): 15–21. 
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basis of that which is just. . . . But there is no association of those things, namely those 
which are similar [oJmoivw~] like soul in its relation to body, the craftsman in relation to 
his tool, and the master in relation to his slave. For in these cases there is no “two,” 
but the former is one, and the latter is not one, but a part of the former.24 Nor is the 
good divisible between each of them, but rather the good of both belongs to the one 
for whose sake they exist. (EE VII.9:1241b13–15, 17–22)
A koinwniva presupposes at least two separate persons, but there exists no “com-
mon” good between master and slave because, ultimately, they are inseparable. 
Although two separate people can seek some common project, there is no “com-
mon” goal between my right and my left hands working in unison. The rest of 
Aristotle’s claims seem to follow from that insight: without a “common” project 
or goal between master and slave, there can be no koinwniva or community; and 
community would seem to be a necessary condition of justice and friendship 
between two people.25
Paradoxically, Aristotle’s denial of any common benefit between master and 
slave in the ethical treatises supports his claim in the Politics that natural slavery 
is beneficial. As noted above, although commentators have found the two claims 
inconsistent, what Aristotle actually says in the Politics is more subtle: throughout, 
he consistently maintains that the interest between master and slave is the same 
(taujto; sumfevrei), and he does so on the grounds that “the same thing is beneficial 
for both part and whole, body and soul, and a slave is some part of a master, a 
sort of living but separate part of his body.”26 Aristotle distinguishes between the 
case of a “common benefit,” which is shared by two separate individuals, and the 
“same benefit,” which is shared by any whole and one of its parts. Because Tom 
and harry are two separate people, they do not have the same interest, but rather 
a common interest; and because my hand is a part of my body, it does not have 
an interest or benefit common to it and the rest of me, but rather the interest of 
my hand is the same as the rest of me. Thus, it is perfectly consistent for Aristotle 
to deny that master and slave have any common benefit, while, at the same time, 
to assert that they possess the same benefit.
There is one last, interesting problem text which some authors have under-
stood to deny Aristotle’s claim that slavery is beneficial for both master and slave. 
In Politics III.6, in the midst of his extended examination of the common good, 
Aristotle writes that 
[t]he despotic rule of a master (although in truth the natural slave and natural master 
have the same benefit [taujtou` sumfevronto~]) is nevertheless exercised for the interest 
of the master and for that of the slave incidentally [kata; sumbebhkov~] (for mastery 
cannot be preserved if the slave is destroyed). (1278b33–36)
Many have taken Aristotle’s assertion to be inconsistent with his account of slavery 
in Politics I, and indeed, even a sly recognition on Aristotle’s part that what was 
24 At 1241b20, the oxford Classical Text reads: ajlla; to; me;n e{n, to; de; tou` eJnov~. {oujdevn} . I instead 
follow Fritzsche: ajlla; to; me;n e{n, to; de; tou` eJnov~ oujd je{n. (Eudemi Rhodii Ethica [regensburg: G.I. Manz, 
1851]). 
25 Necessary but not sufficient: the schema of household relations and regimes suggests that, in 
the deviant koinwniva between siblings, there exists a minimum of friendship but no justice (EN VIII.11: 
1161b9–11).
26 Pol. I.6:1255b9–15; I.2:1252a30–34; cf. I.5:1255a1–3.
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said earlier in the work about natural slavery was not the whole story, since here 
he is granting that the benefit only “accidentally,” or coincidently, accrues to the 
slave.27 No doubt, Aristotle’s locution ‘kata; sumbebhkov~’ indicates the predication 
of an inessential, rather than an essential or necessary, quality or characteristic.28 
But ‘accidental’ does not mean “non-existent.” In the subsequent text, Aristotle 
says that a pilot of a ship captains the vessel for the benefit of the crew, and only 
“accidentally” in his own interest, but that hardly means that a Greek pilot braves 
the storms and pirates of the Aegean out of selfless altruism. rather, the pilot 
qua sailor on the ship directly participates in, and obviously is motivated by, the 
benefit which he qua pilot aims at for the good of all on the ship (1279a4–7). 
Although master and slave take part in the same benefit, the relationship is not 
intentionally a paternalistic one in which the master exercises control only for the 
betterment of the slave.29 But just because mastery is not paternalistic selflessness, 
it does not follow that it is wholly selfish exploitation. Unlike, say, the day laborer 
noted above, the slave enjoys the stability and inclusion within an oijkiva which al-
lowed for his or her betterment. In a world in which exclusion from an oijkiva was 
a form of migrant “homelessness,” participating in such goods even incidentally 
was better than the alternatives.30
Before turning to the question of the viability of Aristotle’s distinction, one 
last word needs to be said about whether or not the master and slave experience 
friendship towards one another. As noted above, the Politics unambiguously asserts 
that, since master and slave have the same benefit, there is friendship between 
them, whereas the Ethics asserts that qua slave, such friendship is impossible.31 I 
suspect that Aristotle did perceive some tension between the two claims, regardless 
of his distinction between a common and same benefit, since both the Eudemian 
and Nicomachean Ethics postulate a qualified friendship between master and slave. 
In the case of the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle claims that, although there is no jus-
tice between a part and a whole, there is instead an ajnavlogon, i.e., a four-termed 
proportion like, just as health is the proper relationship between body and soul, 
so too friendship is the analogous relationship between slave and master.32 The 
claim is slightly more enigmatic in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle writes:
For master and slave have nothing in common [oujde;n ga;r koinovn], since a slave is a 
living tool, just as a tool is an inanimate slave. Therefore, there can be no friendship 
27 See, for instance, Brunt, “Aristotle and Slavery,” 369–70; Smith, “Aristotle’s Theory,” 146.
28 See Metaph. V.30:1025a14–30, VI.2:1026b28–27a8.
29 Cf. Schofield, “Ideology and Philosophy,” 127–28; kraut, Aristotle, 298–99. 
30 Consider for a moment the plight of a 5th- or 4th-century Athenian slave. If the slave is Greek, 
then most likely the slave’s city of origin had been sacked, the adult males of the family have been 
slaughtered, and the women and children of the family sold into bondage. If the slave is not Greek, 
then in addition to the separation from family and home, such a person lives in a foreign world, is un-
able to speak the language, and is ignorant of the most basic Athenian customs—customs, of course, 
which were not readily “publicized” beyond Athens except through legend. In either case, the person 
would have been denied the legal right of marriage or the parental right to off-spring. See further V. 
J. rosivach, “Enslaving Barbaroi and the Athenian Ideology of Slavery,” Historia 48 (1999): 129–57; 
and Brunt, “Aristotle and Slavery,” 379–80.
31 Pol. I.6: 1255b12–14; EN VIII.10: 1161b5–6. 
32 EE VII.10: 1242a29–32. Possibly what Aristotle has in mind is the “metaphorical” problem of 
justly relating the different parts of the soul. See EN V.11: 1138b5–14.
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with a slave qua slave, though there can be qua human being. For there seems to be 
some room for justice in the relations of every human being with every other that is 
capable of sharing in convention and contract [koinwnh`sai novmou kai; sunqhvkh~], and 
hence friendship is also possible, in so far as one is human.33
This passage is confusing because Aristotle first asserts that master and slave have 
nothing in common and then implies that they share a commonality, namely, that 
both have an amount of rationality sufficient to enter into convention (novmo~)34 
and contracts, because both are human. Perhaps some minimum rationality is 
the common thing which master and slave share (koinwnei`n) between them.35 
The problem is that such a bare minimum of rationality is insufficient for being 
an Aristotelian ethical agent, and so, one presumes, a friend.36 As Aristotle re-
minds us, neither children not slaves possess proaivresi~, or choice, but friendship 
(filiva)—as opposed to mere “liking” (f ivlhsi~)—seems to require such a degree of 
mature agency.37 Perhaps friendship of a slave is more like that which is felt for an 
inanimate object, which although likable, is incapable of a return of affection.38
3 .  i s  a r i s t o t l e ’ s  d i s t i n c t i o n  l o g i c a l l y  v i a b l e ?
I have argued that Aristotle’s denial of any common benefit between master and 
slave is consistent with his assertion that natural slavery is beneficial, on the basis of 
the claim that Aristotle distinguishes between a “common benefit,” which presup-
poses two separate individuals, and the “same benefit,” which can exist between 
a whole and its parts. one might grant my textual evidence, acknowledge that 
Aristotle does, in fact, seem to be drawing such a distinction, and yet insist that 
33 EN VIII.11: 1161b3–8, rackham translation adapted, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, (Cambridge, 
MA: harvard University Press, 1990). For such philanthropy or friendship to other humans qua hu-
man, see EN VIII.1: 1155a16–22; but cf. Pol. II.2: 1263b15–28. 
34 Nussbaum suggests that, since Aristotle mentions novmo~ in this passage, he may have the con-
ventional, rather than the natural, slave in mind. See her “Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity: 
Aristotle’s Criticisms of Plato,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. A. o. rorty (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1980), 434 n. 54. 
35 The extent to which a natural slave is rational or capable of following instruction is a difficult 
problem, but ultimately one that is independent of the question of whether master and slave share 
the same or a common benefit. For surveys of the topic, see kraut, Aristotle, 283–90; and deslauriers, 
“Virtues,” 213–31. Cf. Pol. I.5: 1254b23–24; I. 13: 1259b28–29, 1260a11–14. 
36 As harvey (“deliberation and Natural Slavery,” 62–64) points out, the key difference between 
modern and Aristotelian notions of moral agency is that modern liberalism—premised on the claim 
that all men are equal—“deflated” the standard of moral personhood to a bare minimum of deliberative 
ability to which all humans could aspire; Aristotelian “moral personhood” presupposes a deliberative 
excellence obtainable by a small few. Thus, for example, one finds hobbes rejecting Aristotle’s natural 
slavery in the Leviathan because 
[t]he question ‘who is the better man?’ has no place in the condition of mere nature, where 
. . . all men are equal. The inequality that now is, has been introduced by the laws civil. . . . 
For there are very few so foolish that had not rather govern themselves than be governed 
by others; nor when the wise in their own conceit contend by force with them who distrust 
their own wisdom, do they always, or often, or almost at any time, get the victory. (hobbes, 
Leviathan, ed. E. Curley [Indianapolis: hackett, 1994], ch. xv, par. 21)
37 EN III.2:1111b6–10; VIII.5: 1157b29–32; VIII.13: 1163a21–23. on the presuppositions of 
Aristotle’s notion of mature ethical agency, see further my “Ethical Justice and Political Justice,” 
Phronesis 51 (2006): 29–48.
38 EN VIII.2: 1155b26–34; cf. VIII.5: 1157b25. 
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the distinction is a hollow one with no real difference. I wish to consider such a 
response through the examination of two other relationships which seem similar 
to the relationship between master and slave, namely, those which obtain between 
father and child, and between employer and employee. If there is no difference 
between these relationships with respect to the same or common benefit, then 
the distinction may be a questionable one.
The father/child relationship is a good place to start, because Aristotle himself 
draws an important similarity between children and slaves. According to EN V.6, one 
cannot commit injustice against one’s own child for the same reason that one can-
not wrong a slave: until the child is of an age when he can be “separated” (cwrisqh̀/) 
from his father, he too is like “a part of [the father’s] self, and no one intentionally 
chooses to harm one self” (1134b10–12). Indeed, elsewhere Aristotle characterizes 
a child as “something of his parents’ selves” [wJ~ eJautw`n ti] (1161b18) and leaves 
no doubt that,“until a certain age,” the child is intimately a part of his parents.39 At 
the same time, Aristotle’s notion of “father” is hardly a roman paterfamilias—i.e., 
one who possessed the power of life or death over all within his household, even 
after he had attained his majority40—and, in EN VIII.9–12, he explicitly claims that 
between father and son there is a koinwniva, with its own specific bonds of friendship 
and claims of justice. Most likely, although a male child is always his father’s son, 
with time, he also become his own man—his own self, an ejleuvqero~ or free man, 
which the Metaphysics points out is “someone who exists for his own sake [oJ auJtou` 
e{neka] and not for the sake of someone else” (Metaph. I.2:982b26–27). Paternal 
justice between father and son allows for the establishment of a koinwniva between 
what began as a whole and a part, but what subsequently becomes two independent 
persons. But such a claim seems impossible for the master and slave. By definition 
the natural slave of Politics I is, by nature, “not his own self” (mh; auJtou` fuvsei).41 
Although there are passages where Aristotle holds out the freedom of slaves as a 
desideratum, his discussion of “despotic justice” in the Politics seems irreconcil-
able with the notion that a slave over time could gradually become separate and 
free from his master.42 Although children are not their parents’ equals, sons are 
“those who will become partners in the regime [oiJ koinwnoi; th`~ politeiva~],” who 
need to be ruled “as freemen,” or the exact opposite of slave.43 
39 For the notion of an “other self,” see Price, Love and Friendship, 165. For such transitions, see 
d. Tress, “Aristotle’s Child: development Through Genesis, oikos, and Polis,” Ancient Philosophy 17 
(1997): 63–84.
40 dionysius of halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, trans. E. Cary (Cambridge, MA: harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1937), II.26–7. 
41 Pol. I.4:1254a14–15; cf. I.5; 1254b21. 
42 Pol. I.13: 1260a39–b7; cf. Oec. I.5: 1344b5–22; Pol. VII.10: 1330a31–32. See Smith, “Aristotle’s 
Theory,” 153–54. kraut (Aristotle, 297–98) has argued that over time, under proper supervision, the 
natural slave would be able to develop a minimum of virtue and be capable of freedom. In general, 
kraut’s position elevates the rationality of the natural slave and lowers the standard necessary for 
being free. Such a position also seems to undercut the distinction between despotic and paternal 
rule, even though kraut (ibid., 298–99) tries to avoid construing the master and slave relationship 
as paternalistic. Cf. J. Frank, A Democracy of Distinction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 
26–45; and ober, Political Dissent, 345–46. 
43 Pol. I.13: 1260b19–20; I.12: 1259a39–b4; EN VIII.12: 1161a18–20; Pol. I.4: 1254a1–17; I.6: 
1255b9–15.
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Aristotle’s characterization of the relationship between father and child entails 
that the natural slave’s status as a “part” of the master is only a necessary condi-
tion of having the same benefit (rather than a common benefit) with the master. 
A child is part of his father, according to Aristotle, but the father and child share 
a benefit in common. Such a common benefit is an asymmetrical one: Aristotle 
notes that, whereas a father bestows upon a child such gifts as existence, nurture, 
and education, the child can never equally reciprocate, and, like a disciple to his 
teacher, can only return that which is possible rather than that which is owed.44 
But since such a good is asymmetrical, it cannot be one and the same between 
father and son. In sum, the examination of the father/son relationship shows that 
the problem of a common benefit between master and slave turns neither on the 
issue of equality (since two unequals can share a common benefit), nor on the 
issue of being a “part” of another’s self (since children are parents’ other selves). 
To understand the difference between Aristotle’s treatment of a son and a slave, 
we must look elsewhere.
Consider a second relationship: that between an employee and employer. Like 
many modern readers of Aristotle, richard kraut reasonably notes that, although 
one can grant that the best way of life requires leisure, 
[t]his point would not by itself allow Aristotle to conclude that slavery is justified. For 
it could be objected that the benefits obtained through slavery are available in other 
ways. rather than own slaves, one can hire workers to perform the same services. 
one of the questions we must ask is why Aristotle thinks that the benefits of slavery 
could not be equally well secured in some other way.45
According to Aristotle, the relationship between master and slave is one in which 
the benefit received is the same, but the employer/employee relationship is 
one of mutual but separate benefit. If there is no reason why Aristotle preferred 
natural slavery to hired labor, then his distinction between the two kinds of labor 
and the different benefits found in each may seem arbitrary or even ideological. 
Thus, to understand the distinction between free and unfree labor, it is helpful 
to ask why could Aristotle’s master not simply hire a nanny, a housekeeper, and 
a gardener, in order to provide him with the leisure necessary for contemplation 
or political activity?
one possible response would be that the triumphs of ancient Greek society 
depended upon the economic exploitation of a slave class, and that it would have 
been economically impossible for a society both to be based in free labor and to 
provide an upper class with the sort of leisure that Aristotle clearly envisions as 
necessary for the best way of life.46 Put more bluntly: why pay for what you can get 
for free (or, at least, for no more than the cost of boarding your slaves)? Although, 
on the macroeconomic level, there is much debate about the extent to which 
Greek society was dependent upon slave labor, it is wrong to think that Aristotle’s 
virtuous man used slaves to save a drachma here or there.47 Aristotle not only in-
44 EN VIII.11:1161a5–17; VIII.12: 1162a4–9; VIII.14:1163b15–22; IX.1:1164b2–6.
45 kraut, Aristotle, 282. 
46 See, for instance, Brunt, “Aristotle and Slavery,” 344–45, who advances this criticism. 
47 on the relationship between Greek society and its dependence on slavery, see most recently P. 
Cartledge, “Greek Civilization and Slavery,” in Classics in Progress, ed. T. P. wiseman (New York: oxford
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sists that the virtuous man must possess significant external goods (corhgiva), but 
we know from the discussion of the virtue of magnificence (megaloprevpeia) in EN 
IV.2 that such a man is able to make charitable expenditures on the scale of fitting 
out triremes for the navy, sponsoring the entire cast of a play, or giving banquets 
to the public.48 Although the possession of wealth does not make budgeting un-
necessary, it would seem that Aristotle’s virtuous man was financially able to hire 
servants, rather than simply make use of slaves.49 It is necessary to find another 
reason for Aristotle’s preference for unfree labor over hired labor.
one might argue that Aristotle possessed a certain class prejudice that made 
money “dirty” and beneath either Aristotle or his virtuous man.50 It might be 
claimed that the servants Aristotle has in mind—mostly domestic servants respon-
sible for tasks such as child rearing, cooking one’s meals, and taking care of the 
elderly—require a sort of loyalty or allegiance that cannot be obtained through 
wage labor. Thus, for the same reason that Aristotle finds it beneath a philosopher 
to associate with his student for a wage, one might argue that it would be beneath 
a master to have to hire natural slaves; they should simply gravitate towards him 
once they see the benefit he will provide them.51 Although it is true that the typi-
cal roles which Aristotle’s natural slave would fulfill are those which intimately 
incorporated him or her into the master’s oijkiva, Aristotle has no problems with 
the notion of associations modeled upon the mutual advantage found in the re-
lationship between an employer and employee. Indeed, in his discussion of the 
different kinds of friendships, Aristotle is at pains to prove that a relationship of 
mutual advantage—what he classifies as a “utility friendship”—is, in fact, a friend-
ship, albeit one which is likely more short-lived and prone to disagreements than 
friendships based on pleasure or virtue.52 In such an association, or koinwniva, 
each individual enters into the relationship because each is useful to the other. 
when Aristotle describes the characteristics of a koinwniva, he often has just such 
a relationship in mind: for instance, sailors working on a ship together to seek 
profits, or travelers traveling together for mutual protection.53 No doubt, there are 
associations which rise above mere mutual advantage—and Aristotle’s criticisms of 
Lycophron’s “social contract” theory of political association makes clear that the 
polis is not simply an association of mutual advantage (Pol. III.9:1280b8–12)—but 
it does not follow that relationships which exist only for mutual advantage are in 
any way “tainted” for Aristotle. 
why can the relationship of master and slave not be accommodated by the 
“mutual advantage” model of relationship found between employee and employer? 
kraut, for instance, argues that
University Press, 2002), 247–62. The question has a long history; see, for instance, M. I. Finley, “was 
Greek Civilization Based on Slave Labor?” Historia 8 (1959): 145–64. 
48 EN I.10:1101a14–16; IV.2:1122b19–23; cf. X.8:1178a28–34.
49 on the nature of possessions in Aristotle’s household, see Nagle, Households, 31–75.
50 See, for instance, wood and wood, Class Ideology, 230–37.
51 For Aristotle’s criticisms of making the relationship between student and teacher a paid one, 
see EN IX.1:1164a24–b6. 
52 EN VIII.3:1156a10–22; IX.1:1164a2–13. Aristotle criticizes those who would deny that utility 
friendships are in fact forms of friendship simply because they do not rise to the standard of complete 
friendship (EN VIII.4:1157a25–36; EE VII.2:1236a25–34). 
53 See EN VIII.9:1159b27–29, 1160a15–18; VIII.12:1161b13–15; Pol. III.6:1279a4–8.
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[t]he slave benefits from slavery, then, because were he not a slave, he would lead 
a life of idleness, dissolution, and petty immorality. The supervision of a master (at 
any rate, a good master) will keep his worst qualities in check. Properly disciplined, 
he can acquire a small portion of virtue, and although his life can never be a good 
one, since real virtue is beyond his capacities, his subordination to a master make 
him less distant from this ideal than he would otherwise be.54
Is this virtue not a benefit which the slave receives which is his own and separate 
from the benefit which he brings to the master?
when Aristotle claims that the slave is a part of the master, or a living tool, he 
appears to be denying that such a human could derive a benefit that is separable 
from the benefit he shares with a master. Contrary to kraut’s argument above, 
the free or independent natural slave would not be an idle of a dissolute person 
who could benefit from a job; rather, such a natural slave would seem incapable 
of improvement independent of a natural master. As noted above, Aristotle was 
aware of day-laborers or hired artisans, but since he ranks the benefits they re-
ceive below that of a slave, he underscores that the distinction between “mutual 
advantage” relationships and relationships in which both parties have one and 
the same advantage. By analogy, consider what is better for the long-term mainte-
nance of an automobile: that it be rented out to multiple casual users, or that it be 
possessed by a single conscientious owner. Aristotle seems to think that a natural 
slave hired as a wage laborer is like a rental car, which no one owns and for which 
no one cares, because when the rental period is through, the renter knows that 
the long-term care of the car is not his or her problem. In sum, Aristotle endorses 
slave over free labor at least in part because it appears to him to be the only way 
for a natural slave to accrue any consistent or regular benefit.55 
reflection upon kraut’s question—why could Aristotle not have endorsed 
wage labor rather than slave labor?—thus supports my claim that, not only does 
Aristotle distinguish between relationships which aim at a common benefit and 
those in which the benefit aimed at is the same, but also that this is, in fact, a 
viable distinction. In Aristotle’s eyes, the relationship between an employer and 
employee is an association in which there is a common benefit (namely, the 
sustained separate advantages of each individual: the employer has a service per-
formed, the employee receives a wage); a form of “friendship” (each likes what is 
useful in the other); and forms of justice to adjudicate when the relationship has 
gone awry (e.g., withholding wages because of non-performance of a task). That 
we can readily understand that the relationship between master and slave is dif-
ferent in kind from the relationship between an employer and employee—that, 
in the former, there is no common benefit between master and slave, and that 
there is neither friendship nor justice between the two—entails that Aristotle’s 
distinction is a viable one. 
of course, just because a distinction is viable hardly requires that the things so 
distinguished are to be commended. In no way does my analysis support the claim 
that slavery is either just or beneficial. The benefit of my analysis is that it forces 
54 kraut, Aristotle, 297. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for the Journal for underscoring 
the relevance of kraut’s arguments to my own position.
55 See further Simpson, “defense,” 113–15.
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us to face what is truly wrong in Aristotle’s analysis, rather than to be sidetracked 
by an apparent inconsistency in his argument. we tend to bestow personhood on 
all human forms of life (even those in need of guardians), but the institution of 
slavery characterizes a human being as a thing, rather than as a person. when 
confronted with such an institution—almost universal in the world he knew—Aris-
totle applied his sophisticated skills of analysis and suggested a viable distinction to 
make sense of how that institution characterized humans who were not persons.56 
I suspect that it is easier to criticize the institution of slavery as inconsistent with 
personhood than it is to explain and justify why we should accord dignity and per-
sonhood to every human being as such.57 But if Aristotle’s distinction between the 
benefit which accrues to a slave and that which accrues to an individual involved 
in a koinwniva is a viable one, then Aristotle does not contradict himself when he 
claims that natural slavery is beneficial to a slave, but that there is no common 
benefit between the slave and master.58 
56 Nagle (Households, 117) writes—correctly, I think—that 
Aristotle’s analysis of slavery is not vitiated by false consciousness. rather, he reflects ac-
curately the real situation of the Mediterranean slave-owning world in which he lived. he 
is neither subtly undermining the practice of slavery nor overtly sustaining its legitimacy. 
he is merely, thoughtfully, stating what would have been obvious to the more aware of 
his contemporary hearers and readers, who were as familiar as he was with the realities 
of life and labor in the fourth century. In practice, the way to solve the problem of unjust 
enslavement, as everyone knew, was to manumit one’s slaves minimally, as many, including 
Aristotle, did by testament. 
57 For a spirited comparison, see S. r. L. Clark, “Slaves, Servility, and Noble deeds,” Philosophical 
Inquiry 25 (2003): 165–76. 
58 I would like to thank d. Brendan Nagle, Marina McCoy, and two anonymous reviewers for the 
Journal for reading and commenting on previous drafts of this paper.
